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Although scholars have studied presidential legislative success for decades, they have tended to 
focus on the same causal factors. I investigated the effect of presidential campaign visits to 
congressional candidates on legislative support for the president’s preferences in order to push 
for innovation within the literature that discusses presidential legislative success. I used data 
from the 1994 midterms and the 104th Congress and the 2002 midterms and the 108th Congress. 
Regressions and predicted probability calculations revealed that members of the 104th Congress 
as a whole were more likely to vote for the president’s preferences at the beginning of the 
Congress when they received campaign visits and this support decreased over time. This study 
also found that Democrats and Republicans in the 104th Congress responded to visits with 
increased support for the president’s preferences. This support varied over time for Democrats 
and over margins of victory for Republicans 
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 Scholars have studied the causal factors of presidential legislative success for decades, 
but the length of time for which this research has continued belies its narrow scope. This body of 
research consists of the same independent variables being used over and over again to explain 
presidential legislative success and, as a result, the literature treats these variables as faits 
accomplis. By failing to innovate in regard to presidential legislative success, scholars have 
largely ignored other causal factors that may have small effects on presidential legislative 
success. Presidential campaign visits to congressional candidates may be one of these ignored 
causal factors.  
 I examined the impact of presidential campaign visits on legislative support for the 
president’s policy preferences for members of the 104th Congress and members of the 108th 
Congress. Regressions and predicted probabilities revealed that members of the 104th Congress 
were more likely to vote in support of the president’s preferences when they or their opponent 
received a campaign visit in the last midterm election and that this support decreased over time. 
Breaking the 104th Congress down by party revealed that Democrats followed the pattern of 
increased support with visits that decreased over the course of the Congress. However, only 
Republicans who won their seats by margins of victory of less than 10% were more likely to 
support the president’s policy preferences when they faced opponents who received one or more 
visit from the president in the previous midterm. Additionally, the increased support for the 
president’s preferences from these Republicans did not vary over time. Instead, the impact of 
visits on support for Republicans in the 104th Congress who won their districts by a margin of 
less than 10% varied by margin of victory; the impact of visits diminished as a Republican’s 
margin of victory increased up to 10%. The results for members of the 108th Congress were less 
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clear, which could be a result of the lack of votes at the beginning of the 108th Congress included 
in the data. 
Nonetheless, a relationship between visits and support is evident in the 104th Congress.  
The existence of this relationship demonstrates to scholars that they ought to be more inventive 
when researching presidential success in Congress. This relationship has a practical significance 
as well; understanding it could help pundits better analyze presidential travel and assist 
presidential administrations when planning legislative strategy. 
Literature Review 
Campaign Visits 
 Previous studies have mostly focused on debating a small group of causal factors of 
presidential legislative success. Some of these factors are presidential skill, presidential 
popularity, and partisan composition of Congress. Given the monomaniacal focus on this small 
group of factors, it is hardly surprising that there exists very little scholarship that explores the 
effect of  presidential campaign visits on legislative support for the president’s preferences. The 
only study that tests campaign visits as a causal factor of presidential legislative success does 
find a significant relationship between the two variables for incumbent members, but this study 
is highly flawed (Herrnson and Morris 2006a).  First, the authors only examine the impact of 
campaign visits on the president’s co-partisans during the 108th session of Congress and, as such, 
their results may not be generalizable. Further, the authors measure presidential success as an 
aggregate score of the number of times an individual member of Congress voted in favor of the 
president’s positions in a year. The use of an aggregate measure means that the authors may have 
missed patterns in the timing of voting in support of the president’s agenda.  
Moreover, the study is methodologically flawed. The authors fail to control for many of 
the variables traditionally correlated with presidential legislative success. Most significantly, the 
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authors do not control for party membership. While they control for ideological distance from 
the president, party membership may have an independent effect and ought to be included as a 
separate control variable.  Further, the authors measure an important confounding variable 
inadequately. Specifically, they measure presidential popularity by using the portion of the vote 
that Bush received in individual districts (Herrnson and Morris 2006a). While this probably does 
factor into the decisions made by members of Congress, this measure does not wholly 
encompass presidential popularity. There is a huge amount of time in between presidential 
elections and the Congress after the next midterm election and members of Congress probably 
define presidential popularity through something more immediate, like opinion polls. The 
authors’ failure to accurately operationalize presidential popularity and to include other control 
variables makes it unlikely that their results can be trusted. 
Because of the fact that no adequate studies exist on the potential relationship between 
campaign visits and presidential legislative success, it is necessary to look to other bodies of 
literature to find support for hypotheses regarding the effect of visits on support. The body of 
literature that discusses the president’s motivations for midterm campaigning gives insight into 
the mechanisms that may link presidential campaign visits and presidential legislative success 
and the literature that discusses the changing nature of congressional campaigns sheds light on 
when presidential campaign visits may be more likely to impact legislative support for the 
president’s policy preferences. 
Presidential Motivations for Campaign Visits 
There are many studies that focus on why presidents make campaign visits. Some of 
these studies claim that the president campaigns for his party’s candidates in order to increase the 
seats held by his co-partisans in Congress, which makes it easier for him to pass his agenda 
(Keele, Fogarty, and Stimson 2004; Jacobson, Kernell, and Lazarus 2004). Other scholars argue 
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that presidents campaign for their co-partisans in order to make members of Congress feel 
indebted to them and vote in favor of their policy positions if they are elected (Keele 2009; 
Hoddie and Routh 2004; Jacobson, Kernell, and Lazarus 2004). According to these scholars, 
members of Congress who received campaign visits in the previous election feel that they owe 
their seat, at least in part, to the president and this debt translates into support for the president’s 
policy agenda in Congress. Finally, other scholars posit that the president campaigns for specific 
candidates to reward past support for his policy preferences. The studies that test this hypothesis 
find no relationship between a candidate’s past support for the president and being a recipient of 
a presidential campaign visit (Herrnson and Morris 2006b, 2007). 
The body of literature that discusses the president’s motives for campaigning for his co-
partisans is relevant to the examination of presidential campaign visits and legislative support for 
a few reasons. First, this body of literature recognizes, at least theoretically, that campaign visits 
may be related to legislative support for the president’s policy preferences. This literature’s most 
important connection to the examination of campaign visits and legislative success is, however, 
its discussion of indebtedness and rewarding because this discussion reveals two mechanisms 
that may connect campaign visits and legislative support for the president’s policy preferences. 
The idea that a member’s perceived debt to the president causes support for his policy 
preferences is translated directly into one of my hypotheses. However, indebtedness as a 
connecting mechanism has not been empirically tested in this body of literature, so it only 
provides theoretical support for the indebtedness hypothesis.  
The examination of campaign visits as a reward for prior support also provides insight 
into a potential link between campaign visits and support for the president’s policy preferences. 
Despite the fact that the few studies that quantitatively test the impact of prior support on 
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campaign visits find no significant relationship, this mechanism may connect prior visits and 
support if members of Congress think that the president uses campaign visits as rewards. 
Because the body of literature about presidential motivations for visiting candidates looks at 
presidential decision-making and behavior, the quantitative tests can only show that the president 
does not use visits as rewards for previous support. I am interested in congressional behavior, so 
all that matters for my purposes is that members of Congress believe that the president uses 
campaign visits to reward loyal co-partisans. If this is the case, members may try to incentivize 
future campaign visits from the president by voting in favor of his policy preferences in 
Congress. 
Changes in the Nature of Congressional Campaigns 
The body of literature that examines the changing nature of congressional campaigns 
sheds light on when presidential campaign visits may be more likely to have an effect on 
legislative support for the president’s policy preferences. There are two strands of this literature 
that are relevant for my purposes. The first strand is formed by studies that discuss the 
incumbency advantage. The second strand is formed by studies that discuss the decline of 
marginal districts. The first strand, the incumbency advantage literature, argues that a majority of 
incumbents are reelected with increasingly larger margins and that this occurs regardless of the 
political conditions at the time of elections (Abramowitz 1991, 34; Abramowitz, Alexander, and 
Gunning 2006; Mattei and Glasgow 2005). The incumbency advantage has caused some scholars 
to conclude that presidents can have little, if any, impact on congressional elections (Bond and 
Fleisher 1990, 17). These scholars would likely argue that presidential campaign visits do not 
have an effect on legislative support because the incumbency advantage means incumbents do 
not depend on the president’s assistance for fundraising, drawing in media attention, or rallying 
supporters. As such, even if members of Congress receive campaign visits from the president, 
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these members will not feel that they owe their election to his visit or that they will need a future 
visit from the president to get reelected. Under these conditions, therefore, neither indebtedness 
nor incentivizing will be effective in linking presidential campaign visits to legislative support. 
These studies discuss the incumbency advantage as if it is absolute and unchanging, but 
in reality there are elections in which incumbents are defeated. It is possible that presidential 
visits may be perceived to have had an impact on victory when the incumbency advantage is not 
sufficient to secure an incumbent’s seat. As such, if the incumbent faces a strong challenger in a 
competitive district, receives a campaign visit from the president, and wins the election then that 
member of Congress may be more likely to feel that their reelection is, in part, attributable to the 
president’s assistance and feel indebted to him. Similarly, under such circumstances reelected 
members may feel that they will be likely to face another strong challenger in the next election 
cycle and, given the perceived impact of the president’s visit in the previous election, will 
attempt to incentivize a future campaign visit by supporting the president’s policy preferences.  
Studies that discuss the decline in marginal districts form the second strand of the 
changing campaigns body of literature. According to scholars who explore this decrease, the 
incumbency advantage has resulted in fewer competitive districts and a corresponding increase 
in safe districts (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006; Griffin 2006). Prior research has 
found that marginal districts tend to produce moderate candidates who, when elected, are more 
willing to defect from their party’s positions in Congress while safe districts have a tendency to 
produce more ideologically extreme representatives (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; 
Donovan 2007; Froman 1963). One scholar explains these tendencies with overlapping 
“reelection constituencies,” which exist when the president and an opposition party member 
share an electoral base. Because opposition party members depend on a constituency for 
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reelection that also supports the president, they are more likely than their co-partisans to defect 
from their party’s position and vote in support of the president’s policy preferences (Jacobson 
2003a, 6). These overlapping constituencies are more likely to exist in competitive districts than 
in safe districts. However, because marginal districts are increasingly rare and because safe 
districts tend to produce extreme members, scholars in this body of literature would likely argue 
that the president cannot shore up future opposition member support by visiting his co-partisans. 
If a district is not competitive, then the president’s visit will not be viewed as responsible for 
decreasing the opposition member’s margin of victory and making the election closer. 
 These studies discuss marginal districts as though they have been entirely obliterated, but 
that is simply not the case. Even if marginal districts are becoming less common, there are 
always some competitive races during elections. If the opposition party member wins against a 
candidate who received a presidential visit in a marginal district, they are already more 
predisposed to support the president’s policy preferences because they are more likely to share a 
reelection constituency with the president. However, the visit itself may make such members 
more likely to support the president’s policy preferences because they will perceive the 
president’s visit as responsible for increasing their opponent’s vote share and making the election 
closer than it otherwise would have been. 
 When candidates campaign for seats in marginal districts the winner, whether it is the 
visited co-partisan or the opposition party member, may be more likely to support the president’s 
policy preferences in response to a campaign visit. For the president’s co-partisans, visits from 
the president may appear to increase their margins of victory, which will cause them to support 
his policy positions. This support may be because they feel that they owe their seats to the 
president’s visit and wish to repay him or because they want to incentivize future campaign 
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visits. For opposition party members, presidential visits in the previous election may appear to 
have lowered their margins of victory which, counterintuitively, may make such members more 
likely to support the president’s policy positions in order to appeal to their shared electoral 
constituencies.  
Theory 
I expect that presidential campaign visits will affect the voting behavior of the president’s 
co-partisans for whom the president campaigned such that they will be more likely to vote in 
favor of his preferences. I have two competing theories that link visits and support, and these two  
theories lead to different expectations of the timing of support for the president’s preferences in 
Congress. The first theory is that presidential campaign visits to congressional candidates and 
support for the president’s desired policies are linked through indebtedness; members of 
Congress for whom the president campaigned believe that they owe loyalty to the president in 
return for the perceived role he played in getting them elected.  
If the indebtedness theory is true, I suspect that members of Congress who received 
campaign visits from the president will be more likely to support the president’s agenda at the 
beginning of the subsequent term of Congress, but that this support will fade over time. I expect 
support to decrease because members of Congress who received visits are unlikely to 
continuously feel indebted to the president. Once these members have voted in favor of the 
president’s agenda a certain number of times, they are likely to feel that they have paid their debt 
to the president and their support level will decline. Because the indebtedness theory operates 
through the perceived impact of a presidential visit, I expect that the closer the margin of victory 
was for a given member of Congress who received a visit, the more supportive that member will 
be at the beginning of a congressional term. It should be noted that Herrnson and Morris share 
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part of this theory – that campaign visits and presidential success are linked by indebtedness and 
that the effect of visits is limited over time – but they do not elaborate on margins of victory, nor 
do they test for time effects beyond looking at levels of support between the first session of 
Congress and the second session. 
 My second competing theory that links presidential campaign visits and legislative 
support for the president’s agenda relates to incentivizing future presidential support. The 
incentivizing theory is that members of Congress, who are constantly concerned with reelection, 
wish to secure future campaign visits from the president and believe that the best way to do so is 
to support the president’s policy positions. If this theory is true, I expect members of Congress 
who received campaign visits in the previous midterm election to support the president’s agenda 
at the beginning of the congressional term and all of the president’s co-partisans to support the 
president’s policy positions toward the end of the term. Co-partisans who received visits from 
the president will be more likely to support his agenda at the beginning of the term because they 
wish to demonstrate to the president that they will reward him for helping them get elected and 
that they will do so again if the president campaigns for them in future elections. Similarly, the 
president’s co-partisans who vote in favor of the president’s agenda at the end of a term attempt 
to incentivize presidential campaign visits in the upcoming election. By supporting the 
president’s agenda at this stage, members of Congress signal to the president that they are willing 
to vote in line with his policy positions and that it is worth helping them get reelected because 
they will continue to do so in the future. Because incentivizing campaign visits in an upcoming 
election at the end of a term does not require previous campaign visits from the president, I 
expect all members of the president’s party to be more supportive of his agenda at this stage. The 
degree of support for the president’s agenda at both the beginning and end of the term is likely to 
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be dictated in part by each member’s margin of victory in the previous election. Thus, 
individuals who won their districts by a smaller margin of victory will be more likely to support 
the president’s preferences. 
 I expect that members of Congress from the opposition party who won their districts by a 
small margin will be more likely to support the president’s agenda, relative to their co-partisans, 
in order to appease a more moderate constituency. I suspect that increased support may be more 
likely to occur toward the end of the Congress because reelection concerns will be more 
prominent as elections grow nearer.  
Hypotheses 
H1: Members of Congress who received one or more campaign visits from the president during a 
midterm election and who won their districts by smaller margins will be more likely to support 
the president’s policy preferences at the beginning of their terms  
H2: Members of Congress who received campaign visits from the president and who won their 
districts by smaller margins will be more likely to support the president’s preferences at the 
beginning of their terms. Additionally, all of the president’s co-partisans who won their seats by 
smaller margins will be more likely to support the president’s policy preferences at the end of 
their terms.  
H3: Representatives from the opposition party who won their districts by smaller margins and 
whose opponents received one or more campaign visit will be more likely to support the 
president’s policy preferences toward the end of their terms. 
Data and Methods 
 In order to ensure that the results from this study are generalizable, I examined both the 
1994 midterms and the subsequent 104th Congress and the 2002 midterms and the 108th 
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Congress. The 1994 midterm elections took place during President Clinton’s first term and 
resulted in a massive Republican takeover of the House of Representatives. Therefore, voting in 
the 104th Congress took place in the context of divided government with Republicans in control 
of the House and with a Democratic president (Jacobson 1996). The 2002 midterms occurred 
during President Bush’s first term and gave the Republican majority five additional seats in the 
House. As such, the Republican Party retained its majority in the House of Representatives and 
government was unified during the 108th Congress (Jacobson 2003b). Although both midterms 
took place during a president’s first term, variation is provided by the compositions of the two 
Congresses. Given that this study is interested in presidential-congressional relations, the 
variation provided by using a period of divided government after the president’s party lost the 
House and a period of unified government after the president’s party retained the House is 
particularly appropriate. 
 In order to test my hypotheses, I created separate data sets for the 104th Congress and the 
108th Congress. Specifically, I created panel data sets arranged alphabetically by member of 
Congress. I chose to examine key domestic and economic policy votes on which the president 
took a position.i There were 22 such votes during the 104th Congress and 13 such votes during 
the 108th Congress. The dependent variable is support for the president’s policy preferences. This 
dichotomous variable was coded 1 if a member of Congress voted in favor of the president’s 
position on a given vote. If a member of Congress voted against the president’s preference on a 
given vote then the variable was coded 0. Each member’s vote was coded for all of the identified 
key votes. The primary independent variable is the number of visits received by the president’s 
co-partisan in each race during the previous midterm election. For members of the president’s 
party who won the election, this variable is coded as the number of visits made by the president 
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to their state during which the president explicitly advocated for their election. For members of 
Congress who belonged to the opposition party, the visits variable is coded as the number of 
these visits received by their opponents in the election. Members of Congress who ran 
unopposed in the midterm election and members who did not run against a candidate from the 
president’s party were omitted. I expect that visits will have a positive coefficient, which will 
indicate that visits increased a member’s likelihood of voting in support of the president’s 
preferences when time was equal to zero.  
 I compiled the number of visits made to each candidate by examining the Public Papers 
of the Presidents archive for presidential remarks made while traveling during the six months 
before each Election Day.ii If the president made a remark that explicitly advocated for the 
election of a specific candidate while travelling in that candidate’s state, then that member or that 
candidate’s victorious opponent was considered to have received a visit.iii  This method of 
classification yielded 42 visits made by President Clinton on behalf of 33 candidates in 1994 and 
44 visits made by President Bush on behalf of 34 candidates in 2002. The number of visits 
received by any one member of the 104th Congress ranged from one to three and the number of 
visits received by any member of the 108th Congress ranged from one to two. 
I defined a campaign visit as a remark made by the president in which he explicitly 
advocated for a specific candidate while traveling to that candidate’s state in the six months 
before Election Day. This definition allowed for a consistent method of classifying visits given 
the numerous settings in which the presidents campaigned and the fact that there were numerous 
candidates mentioned by the presidents during these campaign stops. Restricting the definition of 
campaign visits to remarks made at events that were explicitly related to the midterm election, 
like fundraisers and rallies, was too narrow a method given President Bush’s tendency to 
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advocate for candidates in more informal settings, such as outside of airports. Moreover, even if I 
had restricted the definition of visits to such events, I would still have needed a method for 
distinguishing remarks that advocated for a candidate’s election from remarks that simply 
thanked a candidate for their presence since both types of remarks were made at fundraisers and 
rallies. Therefore, instead of looking at remarks made at explicitly election-related events, I 
looked at remarks made by the president that unambiguously advocated for a particular 
candidate’s election at any type of event that took place when the president travelled. 
 One disadvantage of using this definition is that events during which the president 
expressed a desire to see a candidate elected in a few sentences are given the same weight as 
events during which the president focused entirely on one candidate or a small group of 
candidates. However, given the difficulties of consistently classifying visits based on remarks 
made in different settings and among non-endorsement mentions of other candidates, I believe 
that the method that I used was the best way to ensure that all candidate endorsements were 
included. I expect the coefficient for visits to be positive, which will indicate that visits increased 
a member’s likelihood of voting in support of the president’s preferences when time equaled 
zero. 
 There were a number of other variables included in the two data sets to help test my 
hypotheses. First, I included a time variable that was coded as the number of days after the first 
day of the Congress that each vote took place. There is also a margin of victory variable that was 
calculated by subtracting the percentage of the vote that each member’s closest opponent 
received in the prior election from the percentage of the vote received by the member of 
Congress.iv I then constructed three interaction variables in order to account for different aspects 
of my hypotheses. The first interaction variable I created was timexvisits which was the result of 
16 
multiplying the value of time and the number of visits received by each member. This variable 
was used to test how the impact of a visit on a member’s likelihood of voting in favor of the 
president’s policy preference changed over the course of the term. I expect the coefficient to be 
negative for this variable if the indebtedness hypothesis is correct, according to which the impact 
of visits on voting in favor of the president’s preferences should decrease throughout the term. I 
am not certain which direction the coefficient will be in if the incentivizing hypothesis is correct 
because this hypothesis posits that the impact of visits first decreases and then increases toward 
the end of the term. If the initial decrease is greater than the increase, then I expect the 
coefficient to be negative. If the secondary increase is greater than the initial decrease, I expect 
the coefficient for timexvisits to be positive. The opposition party hypothesis speculates that 
opposition party members whose opponents received visits will increase their support toward the 
end of the Congress. Therefore, I expect timexvisits to be positive when regressions are limited 
to opposition party members. 
Next, I constructed marginxvisits to account for the conditional relationship between 
margin of victory, visits, and voting in support of the president’s preferences. I expect that the 
coefficient will be negative because I hypothesize that the lower the margin of victory was for a 
member who received a visit or whose opponent received a visit, the more likely that member 
will be to vote in support of the president’s preferences.  The final interaction variable that I 
constructed was timexmargin, which I included in order to test the portion of the incentivizing 
hypothesis that claims that all of the president’s co-partisans who won by smaller margins of 
victory will be more likely to vote in favor of the president’s policy preferences toward the end 
of the term. Therefore, I expect that the coefficient of timexmargin will be positive if the 
incentivizing hypothesis is true.  
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 Finally, there were a number of control variables included in the two data sets. The first 
control included was a dummy variable for party membership. I also included a presidential 
popularity variable as a control because of the preponderance of studies that focus on it as a 
causal factor of presidential legislative success. I used Gallup’s presidential job approval rating 
from 5 days to three weeks before each vote to code the presidential popularity variable.v 
Another important control variable included in both data sets is each member’s ideological 
distance from the president. I included the ideological distance variable in order to control for the 
probability that members of Congress who are ideologically similar to the president will vote in 
favor of his preferences simply because they share those preferences. This variable is coded 
using the first dimension of Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scale. Specifically, 
ideological distance from the president is operationalized as the difference between the 
president’s score on the first dimension and each member’s score on the same dimension.vi  
Members who switched parties during the Congress were omitted. The final control variable in 
the two data sets is whether or not a member of Congress retired from the House of 
Representatives after their term ended. It was necessary to account for retiring members because 
both the incentivizing hypothesis and the opposition party member hypothesis speculate that the 
relationship between visits and supporting votes is driven by a member’s need to secure 
reelection.  If either of these hypotheses are correct, then failing to account for retiring members 
may skew the results. This variable was coded 1 for members who retired from the House of 
Representatives and 0 for members who ran for reelection.vii Members who resigned or died 
during their term were omitted.  
 I used logistic regression because the dependent variable, voting in support of the 
president’s preference, is dichotomous. I first ran logistic regressions for each Congress that 
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looked at the Congress as a whole. I also ran regressions that broke the results down by party in 
order to look at the relationship between visits and voting in support of the president’s policy 
preferences for members of the president’s party and for members of the opposition party. 
Standard errors were calculated with clustering by members. When timexvisits or marginxvisits 
were significant, I calculated the predicted probabilities of voting in support of the president’s 
preferences in order to quantify the impact of time and visits or margin and visits on supporting 
votes. 
Results and Analysis 
I began my data analysis with the 104th Congress. I first ran a logistic regression that 
examined the effect of visits, time, presidential popularity, margin of victory, ideological 
distance, retiring, Republicanism, timexvisits, marginxvisits, and timexmargin on voting in favor 
of the president’s preferences for the Congress as a whole, which means that both Republicans 
and Democrats were included. The results from this regression are displayed in table one. 
Table One 
Log-Odds of Voting in Favor of the President’s Preferences in the 104th Congress 
 Vote for President’s 
Preferences 
  
Visits 0.549* 
 (0.238) 
  
Time 0.00100** 
 (0.000377) 
  
Presidential Popularity 0.159*** 
 (0.0102) 
  
Margin of Victory 0.00515 
 (0.00395) 
  
Ideological Distance 2.348** 
 (0.798) 
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Retiring -0.141 
 (0.126) 
  
Republican -0.506 
 (0.633) 
  
TimexVisits -0.00131* 
 (0.000607) 
  
MarginxVisits -0.00465 
 (0.00403) 
  
TimexMargin -0.0000158 
 (0.0000101) 
  
Constant -6.506*** 
 (0.498) 
Observations 8471 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The results from the first regression show that the impact of visits alone is significant at 
the .05 level for the 104th Congress overall. Although the coefficients are still in log-odds form, 
the fact that the visits coefficient is positive indicates that members of the 104th Congress were 
more likely to vote in support of the president’s policy preferences when they or their opponent 
had received a campaign visit in the previous midterm election when time was equal to zero. 
Moreover, the interaction variable for time and visits is significant at the .05 level and the 
negative coefficient reflects the fact that the impact of visits decreases as time increases. I can 
therefore reject the null hypothesis for the 104th Congress. That timexvisits is negative does not 
necessarily indicate that the indebtedness hypothesis is correct because the coefficient can be 
negative if the incentivizing hypothesis is true and the initial decrease in support is greater than 
the secondary increase. However, the fact that timexmargin is insignificant strengthens the 
support for the indebtedness hypothesis because the alternative theory, the incentivizing 
hypothesis, posits that all of the president’s co-partisans who won their seats by smaller margins 
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of victory will be more likely to vote in favor of the president’s preferences as the next election 
approaches. Marginxvisits is not significant, though the coefficient is in the expected direction. 
This is surprising because I expected smaller margins of victory to increase the effect of visits on 
support in all of my hypotheses. The insignificance of marginxvisits does not suggest support for 
one hypothesis over another, but it does suggest that the perceived impact of a visit was not 
determined by a member’s margin of victory in the 104th Congress as a whole. 
Another result from this regression that is worth noting is that the Republican variable is 
not significant for the 104th Congress. This indicates that members of the 104th Congress were 
not influenced by their membership in the Democratic Party or in the Republican Party when 
voting on policies about which the president stated a preference. This insignificance is likely the 
result of the presence of the ideological distance control variable. In fact, when the ideological 
distance variable is removed from the regression, Republicanism becomes highly significant. 
The initial regression of the 104th Congress indicates that the interaction between visits 
and time had an effect on voting in support of the president’s policy preferences but because the 
coefficients are in log-odds form, it is impossible to examine the size of the impact of visits at 
each time. In order to understand the substantive significance of visits, I calculated the predicted 
probability of voting in support of the president’s policy preferences for each possible 
combination of time and visits while holding the other covariates at their means.viii Because they 
show the impact of visits at the time of each vote, the predicted probabilities should also indicate 
whether the indebtedness or the incentivizing hypothesis is correct. The predicted probabilities of 
voting for the president’s preferences for the entire 104th Congress at the time of each vote are 
displayed in appendix one. Table two displays three of the important predicted probabilities for 
the 104th Congress. 
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Table Two 
Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of the President’s Preferences in the 104th 
Congress 
    
Visits=0 Visits=1 Visits=2 Visits=3 
 22 0.486 0.614 0.728 0.818 
  (.031) (.054) (.087) (.098) 
      
Time 437 0.589 0.583 0.577 0.571 
  (.013) (.029) (.059) (.09) 
      
 636 0.636 0.568 0.497 0.426 
  (.027) (.054) (.103) (.151) 
      
Standard errors in parentheses 
Two general trends in the predicted probabilities are apparent. First, average members of 
the 104th Congress who did not receive visits or face opponents who received visits in the 
previous midterm election had higher probabilities of voting in support of the president’s 
preferences as time increased. This is consistent with the positive coefficient for the time 
variable in the regression for the 104th Congress, which indicated that when visits equaled zero, 
members were more likely to vote for the president’s policy preferences as time increased. The 
second trend displayed in the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress is that the impact of 
visits decreased over time, which supports the indebtedness hypothesis and undermines the 
incentivizing hypothesis. Another fact illuminated by the predicted probabilities is that at some 
point during the Congress the likelihood of voting in support of the president’s preferences for 
average members who did not receive visits surpassed the probability of voting in support of his 
preferences for members who did receive visits. After that time, the more visits an average 
member received, the lower their probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences 
was. 
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Figure One 
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Figure Three 
 
 
Figure Four 
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  The predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress convey the substantive significance of 
visits at the time of each vote. As expected for the indebtedness hypothesis, the probability of 
voting in support of the president’s preferences for average members who did not receive visits 
was lowest at the time of the first vote, which was on day 22 for the 104th Congress. Conversely, 
the impact of visits on an average member’s probability of voting in support of the president for 
members who did receive visits is strongest at the earliest time. Members who did not receive 
visits had a 48.6% probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences on day 22 while 
members who received one visit had a 61.4% probability of voting for the president’s policy 
preference at the same time, which means that receiving one visit increased a member’s 
probability of support by 12.8%. The probability of voting in support of the president’s 
preferences on day 22 increased by 11.4% to 72.8% for members who received two visits and to 
81.8% for members of Congress who received three visits, which was an increase of 9% from the 
probability of support with two votes.ix Clearly, visits had a substantive effect on a member’s 
likelihood of voting in support of the president’s preferences when the impact of visits was at its 
strongest. 
 The 437th day of the 104th Congress was the point in time at which the probability of 
voting in support of the president’s policy preferences with no visits surpassed the probability of 
supporting the president’s policy preferences with one or more visits. Specifically, on the 437th 
day, the probability of voting for the president’s preferences was 58.9% for an average member 
who had not received visits in the previous midterm campaign. The probability for members who 
received one visit was 58.3%; with two visits, the probability of support was 57.7%; and the 
probability of support for members who received three visits dropped to 57.1%.  
 By the day of the last vote, day 636, the gap between the probability of support for 
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members with no visits and those with one, two, and three visits had further widened. At that 
time, members who had not received visits had a 63.6% probability of voting for the president’s 
preferences. Members who received one visit had a 56.8% probability of voting in accordance 
with the president’s preference, members with two visits had a 49.7% probability of support, and 
members with three visits had only a 42.6% probability of voting for the president’s preferences. 
The total increase in the probability of voting in support of the president from day 22 to day 636 
for members who did not receive visits was 15%. The total decrease in probability was 4.6% for 
members with one visit, 23.1% for members with two visits, and 39.2% for members who 
received three visits during the previous campaign. 
Figure Five 
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his policy positions toward the beginning of the Congress, but they also resulted in the 
probability of support with visits being substantially lower than the probability with no visits 
toward the end of the term, particularly for members who received multiple visits. The tradeoff 
for President Clinton, then, was between support levels that were higher than they would 
otherwise have been at the beginning of the Congress and support levels that were lower than 
they would otherwise have been after the 437th day of Congress. The relatively small decrease 
over time in the probability of support with one visit may present a good solution to this tradeoff 
if the same pattern is displayed in the 108th Congress. The effect of one visit is smaller than the 
effect of multiple visits at the beginning of the Congress, but the gap between the probability of 
support with zero visits and with one visit is much smaller than the gap between zero visits and 
multiple visits at the end of the term. 
The existence of this tradeoff does not change the fact that the predicted probabilities for 
the 104th Congress support the indebtedness hypothesis. Members of the 104th Congress who 
received campaign visits from the president during the 1994 midterms were more likely to vote 
in favor of the president’s policy preferences at the beginning of their terms and this support 
decreased over time. Eventually, the probability of voting for the president’s preferences for 
members who did not receive visits surpassed the probability for members who did receive 
campaign visits. The timing of the support indicates that indebtedness hypothesis is correct and 
therefore implies that visits and supporting votes are linked through the fact that members 
believe that the president’s visit helped them win their seats. 
Although the analysis of the 104th Congress as a whole suggests that the indebtedness 
hypothesis is correct, there is a possibility that looking at the results for Democrats and 
Republicans together is masking other significant relationships. Another possibility is that the 
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relationships that are significant for the 104th Congress are stronger or weaker when the 
regression is limited to a single party. Therefore, I also examined the impact of the independent 
variables on voting in favor of the president’s policy preferences for Democrats and Republicans 
in the 104th Congress. The results for Democrats in the 104th Congress are displayed in table 
three. 
Table Three 
Log-Odds of Voting in Favor of the President’s Preferences for Democrats in the 104th 
Congress 
 Vote for President’s 
Preferences 
  
Visits 0.607** 
 (0.205) 
  
Time 0.00119* 
 (0.000588) 
  
Presidential Popularity 0.0285* 
 (0.0139) 
  
Margin of Victory 0.0121 
 (0.00629) 
  
Ideological Distance 5.055*** 
 (0.338) 
  
Retiring -0.177 
 (0.114) 
  
TimexVisits -0.00146** 
 (0.000504) 
  
MarginxVisits -0.00929* 
 (0.00468) 
  
TimexMargin -0.0000549*** 
 (0.0000159) 
  
Constant 0.597 
 (0.623) 
Observations 4024 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
First, when the regression is limited to the president’s co-partisans in the 104th Congress, 
visits and timexvisits are statistically significant at the .01 level and are thus more strongly 
significant for Democrats in the 104th Congress than they were for the Congress as a whole. 
Additionally, both coefficients are in the expected direction. Visits has a positive relationship 
with voting in favor of the president’s policy preferences, which means that Democrats who 
received visits were more likely to support the president’s policy preferences when time equaled 
zero. Timexvisits has a negative coefficient, which means that the impact of visits decreased over 
time. This does not necessarily support the indebtedness hypothesis over the incentivizing 
hypothesis, but because the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress as a whole indicated 
support for indebtedness, I suspect that the negative coefficient on timexvisits refers to an overall 
decrease in the impact of visits over time, not an initial decrease that was larger than a secondary 
increase. Calculating the predicted probabilities of support for Democrats in the 104th Congress 
will either confirm or deny this supposition. 
 Although the margin variable is not significant by itself, the two interaction variables that 
involve the margin of victory, marginxvisits and timexmargin, are statistically significant when 
the regression is limited to Democrats in the 104th Congress.  The marginxvisits variable is 
significant at the .05 level and has a negative coefficient, which means that the impact of visits 
decreased as margins of victory increased for the president’s co-partisans. Both the indebtedness 
hypothesis and the incentivizing hypothesis posit that members of the president’s party are more 
likely to vote in favor of the president’s preferences when they won their seats by smaller 
margins of victory, so by itself, the marginxvisits variable does not suggest which hypothesis is 
correct. The fact that the marginxvisits variable is significant and in the expected direction does 
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indicate that the impact of visits was dependent on smaller margins of victory. This supports the 
idea that the president’s co-partisans were more likely to perceive the president’s visit as 
partially responsible for their victory when they won close elections.  
 The timexmargin variable is strongly significant for Democrats in the 104th Congress. I 
expected that the interaction between time and margin of victory would be significant if the 
incentivizing hypothesis was true; all members of the president’s party who won their seats by 
smaller margins would be more likely to vote in support of the president’s policy preferences 
toward the end of their terms because they would want to incentivize a campaign visit from the 
president in the upcoming election. Therefore, I expected that if the incentivizing hypothesis 
were true then the timexmargin variable would have a positive coefficient, which would indicate 
that the impact of a member’s margin of victory on voting in support of the president’s 
preferences increased over time. However, the interaction variable for time and margin is 
negative in the regression for the Democrats in the 104th Congress, which means that the impact 
of a member’s margin of victory on support for the president’s policy preferences decreased over 
time. This unexpected directionality means that the significance of the timexmargin variable 
does not increase support for the incentivizing hypothesis or weaken the support for the 
indebtedness hypothesis. I am not certain how to explain the negative relationship between 
timexmargin and voting in favor of the president’s preferences.  
 In order to understand the substantive significance of visits for Democrats in the 104th 
Congress and to determine which hypothesis is supported, I calculated the predicted probability 
of voting in support of the president’s preferences for average Democrats for each combination 
of time and visits. The complete table of predicted probabilities is contained in appendix two. 
Table four displays the predicted probability of voting in support of the president’s policy 
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preferences for Democrats in the 104th Congress on three of the most important days of the 104th 
Congress. 
Table Four 
Predicted Probability of Voting for the President’s Policy Preferences for Democrats in the 
104th Congress 
    
Visits=0 Visits=1 Visits=2 Visits=3 
 22 0.743 0.837 0.901 0.942 
  (.035) (.034) (.036) (.032) 
      
Time 437 0.825 0.821 0.816 0.812 
  (.012) (.023) (.044) (.067) 
      
 636 0.857 0.813 0.759 0.695 
  (.023) (.04) (.081) (.136) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
The patterns in the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress as a whole are also 
present when the probabilities are broken down for Democrats. Members who did not receive 
visits from President Clinton during the previous midterm election had an increased probability 
of voting for his preferences as time progressed. Alternatively, members who received one or 
more campaign visit had a higher probability of voting in support of the president’s policy 
preferences at the beginning of the Congress, but this probability decreased over time. Therefore, 
the results for Democrats in the 104th Congress support the indebtedness hypothesis. 
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Figure Six 
 
 
 
Figure Seven 
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Figure Eight 
 
 
 
 
Figure Nine 
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 The predicted probabilities were higher for all Democrats in the 104th Congress than they 
were for the overall Congress, which is most likely a reflection of the fact that the distance 
between President Clinton’s ideology and the mean ideology of his co-partisans was smaller  
than the distance between President Clinton’s ideology and the mean ideology of the Congress as 
a whole. On the day of the first vote included in the data, day 22, Democrats who did not receive 
a visit in the previous campaign had a 74.3% probability of voting in support of the president’s 
preferences. This probability increased to 83.7% when an average Democrat received one 
campaign visit from the president and to 90.1% when visits were increased to two. Finally, 
average Democrats in the 104th Congress had a 94.2% probability of voting in support of the 
president’s preferences on day 22 when they received three visits. Therefore, when the 
probability of supporting the president’s preferences was at its lowest for Democrats who did not 
receive campaign visits and at its highest for those who did, moving from zero visits to one visit 
resulted in a 9.4% increase in probability; an increase from one visit to two visits led to a 6.4% 
increase in probability; and an increase from two to three visits caused a 4.1% increase in the 
probability of an average Democrat voting in support of the president’s preferences. 
 Just as it did for the 104th Congress as a whole, the probability of supporting the 
president’s policy preferences for an average Democrat who did not receive campaign visits 
surpassed the probability for those who did on the 437th day of the Congress. At that point in 
time, Democrats who did not receive visits had an 82.5% probability of voting in support of the 
president’s preferences. The president’s co-partisans with one visit had an 82.1% probability of 
support, those with two visits had a probability of 81.6%, and those who received three visits had 
an 81.2% probability of voting in support of the president’s policy preferences. The differences 
34 
in the probability of voting for the president’s preferences with zero visits, one visit, two visits, 
and three visits continued to grow until the end of the Congress.  
By the time of the last vote included in the data for the 104th Congress, which was on day 
636, an average Democrat who did not receive a campaign visit had an 85.7% probability of 
voting for the president’s preferences. As such, Democrats who did not receive campaign visits 
had a total increase of 11.4% in their probability of support over the course of the Congress. 
Conversely, Democrats with one visit had a probability of 81.3% on day 636 and had a 2.4% 
total decrease in their probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences over the 
104th Congress. Democrats who received two visits had a 75.9% predicted probability of voting 
for the president’s favored policies and a had total decrease in probability of 14.2%. Finally, 
average Democrats who received three visits had a probability of support of 69.5%, which was a 
total drop of 24.7% over the course of the Congress. 
Figure Ten 
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 The predicted probabilities for Democrats in the 104th Congress mirror those of the 104th 
Congress as a whole, although Democrats had higher probabilities of supporting the president’s 
desired policies overall. The tradeoff between higher support at the beginning of the Congress 
and lower support at the end of the Congress is displayed in the results for Democrats in the 
104th Congress, as is the fact that the probability of support with one visit had a much smaller 
decline over the term than did the probability of support with multiple visits. Additionally, the 
fact that campaign visits increased the probability that Democrats would vote in support of the 
president’s preferences toward the beginning of the term and that this support faded over time 
describes the timing of increased support that is posited in the indebtedness hypothesis. 
Therefore, the predicted probabilities for the president’s co-partisans in the 104th Congress add 
support for the indebtedness hypothesis. 
Finally, limiting the regression to Republicans in the 104th Congress revealed no 
statistical significance for visits or for any of the interaction variables. The results from this 
initial regression are displayed in the first column of table five. The lack of significance suggests 
that I cannot reject the null hypothesis for members of the opposition party. However, it is still 
possible that members of the opposition party who won their seats by a small margin of victory 
were more likely to vote in favor of the president’s policy preferences but that this relationship is 
suppressed in the results displayed in column one of table five. As such, I ran a regression 
limited to members of the Republican Party who won their seats by a margin of victory of less 
than 10%. The results from this regression are displayed in column two of table five. 
Table Five 
Log-Odds of Voting in Favor of the President’s Preferences for Republicans in the 104th 
Congress 
 (1) (2) 
 Republicans Republicans with 
Margin<10 
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Visits 0.152 1.268* 
 (0.427) (0.614) 
   
Time 0.00126** 0.000910 
 (0.000433) (0.00112) 
   
Presidential Popularity 0.314*** 0.335*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0376) 
   
Margin of Victory 0.00505 -0.0532 
 (0.00434) (0.0843) 
   
Ideological Distance 1.609* 1.529** 
 (0.761) (0.511) 
   
Retiring 0.0912 0.203 
 (0.174) (0.121) 
   
TimexVisits -0.000158 -0.000483 
 (0.000700) (0.000968) 
   
MarginxVisits 0.00569 -0.168* 
 (0.00887) (0.0803) 
   
TimexMargin -0.0000120 0.0000589 
 (0.00000927) (0.000190) 
   
Constant -15.98*** -16.93*** 
 (0.968) (1.823) 
Observations 4447 896 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Limiting the analysis to Republican members of the 104th Congress who won their seats 
by a margin of less than 10% shows that visits are statistically significant at the .05 level. The 
positive coefficient means that Republicans whose opponents received campaign visits from 
President Clinton and who won their districts by a margin of less than 10% were more likely to 
vote in favor of the president’s policy preferences when time was equal to zero. The interaction 
variable for margin and visits is also significant for House Republicans with margins of less than 
10% in the expected direction. The negative coefficient reflects the fact that the effect of visits 
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on voting in favor of the president’s preferences increased as margins of victory decreased.  
Neither of the interaction variables featuring time are significant for this cohort. I expected 
Republicans whose opponents received visits and who won by small margins of victory to be 
more likely to support the president’s preferences toward the end of their terms but the fact that 
timexvisits is insignificant indicates that Republicans who won their seats by a margin of less 
than 10% and whose opponents received visits had probabilities of support that did not vary over 
time. 
 The results of the regression for House Republicans with margins of less than 10% 
suggest that the null hypothesis can be rejected and that the hypothesis about members of the 
opposition party can be partially accepted. The portion of the hypothesis that posits that members 
of the opposition party who won their districts by smaller margins of victory and whose 
opponents received at least one campaign visit from the president are more likely to vote in 
support of the president’s preferences can be accepted. However, this hypothesis also speculates 
that members of the opposition party who won their seats by a smaller margin and whose 
opponents received visits will be more likely to vote in favor of the president’s policy 
preferences toward the end of their term. This portion of the opposition party member hypothesis 
must be rejected because timexvisits is insignificant. 
The coefficients reported in table five are in log-odds form and are not indicative of the 
substantive significance of campaign visits for the likelihood of voting in support of the 
president’s preferences for Republicans in the 104th Congress who won their seats by margins of 
less than 10%. In order to quantify the impact of visits for such Republicans, I calculated the 
predicted probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences with every possible 
combination of visits and margin of victory from .5 to 10 in increments of .5. All other covariates 
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were held at their means. The predicted probabilities for all combinations of margin of victory 
(up to 10%) and visits are displayed in appendix three. The predicted probabilities of voting for 
the president’s preferred policies with a margin of victory of .5% and 10% are reported in table 
six. This table also displays the predicted probabilities of voting for the president’s preferences 
with a margin of victory of 8%, which was the margin at which the predicted probability with 
zero visits surpassed the predicted probability with one, two, or three visits. 
Table Six 
Predicted Probability of Voting for the President’s Preferences for Republicans in the 104th 
Congress with Margins of Victory of Less Than 10% 
    Visits=0 Visits=1 Visits=2 Visits=3 
 0.5 0.266 0.542 0.795 0.927 
  (.07) (.16) (.193) (.119) 
      
Margin 8 0.2 0.184 0.172 0.161 
  (.05) (.066) (.121) (.175) 
      
 10 0.18 0.126 0.087 0.059 
  (.07) (.067) (.084) (.088) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
One difference in the pattern of the predicted probabilities for Republicans with a margin 
of victory of less than 10% is that the probability of voting in support of the president’s 
preferences decreased as margins increased for every value of visits. Conversely, predicted 
probabilities increased over time when visits equaled zero for Democrats and the 104th Congress 
as a whole. Nonetheless, the predicted probability of voting for the president’s desired policies 
with zero visits did surpass the predicted probability of voting in support of the president when 
visits equaled one, two, or three. This first occurred when an average Republican had a margin of 
victory of 8%. Additionally, the impact of visits was highest when a Republican had a margin of 
victory of .5% and this impact decreased as the margin of victory increased. 
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Figure Eleven 
 
 
Figure Twelve 
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Figure Thirteen 
 
 
Figure Fourteen 
 
-.5
0
.5
1
1.
5
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 V
ot
ing
 fo
r t
he
 P
re
sid
en
t's
 P
re
fe
re
nc
es
.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
Margin of Victory
Probability
95% Confidence Interval
104th Congress: Republicans with a Margin of Less Than 10%
Probability of Voting for the President's Preferences over Margin When Visits=2
-.5
0
.5
1
1.
5
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 V
ot
ing
 fo
r t
he
 P
re
sid
en
t's
 P
re
fe
re
nc
es
.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
Margin of Victory
Probability
95% Confidence Interval
104th Congress: Republicans with a Margin of Less Than 10%
Probability of Voting for the President's Preferences over Margin When Visits=3
41 
Republicans with the smallest margins of victory had higher probabilities of voting in 
support of the president’s preferences and those who won against opponents who received visits 
in the previous election had the highest probability of voting in support of the president among 
those with small margins. Republican members of the 104th Congress with a margin of victory of 
.5% had a 26.6% probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences when their 
opponents did not receive campaign visits in the previous election. This probability increased by 
27.6% to a 54.2% probability for members whose opponents received one visit in the 1994 
midterm and by 25.3% to a 79.5% probability for members whose opponents received two visits. 
Finally, Republicans who won with a margin of .5% against opponents with three visits had a 
92.7% probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences, an increase of 13.2% from 
the probability with two visits. However, the stronger probabilities of support with smaller 
margins deteriorated rather quickly as margins of victory increased, and when the margin of 
victory increased to 8%, Republicans had a slightly higher probability of voting in support of the 
president’s preferences when their previous opponent did not receive visits. 
The gap between probabilities when visits equaled zero and when visits equaled one, two, 
or three increased as margins increased from 8%. The probability of voting in favor of the 
president’s preferred policies was 18% for Republican members who won their seats by a 10% 
margin of victory and whose opponents did not receive visits. This probability dropped by a total 
of 8.6% from a margin of .5% to a margin of 10%. Members who won their seats by 10% and 
whose previous opponent received one visit had a 12.6% probability of voting in support of the 
president’s preferences. Therefore the impact of one visit on a Republican’s probability of voting 
for the president’s desired policies decreased by a total of 41.6% from a margin of victory of .5% 
to a margin of 10%. The likelihood of supporting the president’s preferences for Republicans 
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who won their seats by a 10% margin and who faced an opponent who received two visits was 
8.7%, a total drop of 70.8% from a margin of .5%. Finally, average Republicans who won their 
seats by 10% and whose opponents received three visits during the previous campaign had a 
5.9% probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences. Therefore, the impact of 
three visits dropped by 86.6% from a margin of .5% to a margin of 10%.  
 Although the predicted probabilities for Republicans who won their seats by a margin of 
less than 10% vary over margin of victory, not time, a similar tradeoff is displayed with both 
probabilities. Visits significantly increased the probability of support for Republicans who won 
their seats by very small margins, but the impact decreased rapidly as margins increased. When 
the impact of visits vary across margins, one visit is not an attractive solution to the problem of 
the tradeoff as it is when the impact of visits varied over time because the probability of support 
with one visit has a much larger total decrease over margin than it does over time. 
Figure Fifteen 
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Even with this tradeoff,  the predicted probabilities for Republicans in the 104th Congress 
who won their seats by margins of less than 10% support the opposition party member 
hypothesis. These probabilities clearly illustrate that visits had a substantive effect on an 
opposition party member’s probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences when 
that member won their seat by a very small margin of victory. The probabilities also reflect the 
fact that the impact of visits decreased as an opposition party member’s margin of victory 
increased.  
Therefore, the results from the 104th Congress lead me to reject the null hypothesis and 
the incentivizing hypothesis. These regressions and probabilities also lead me to accept the 
indebtedness hypothesis and accept the opposition party member hypothesis, excluding the 
aspect that deals with the timing of opposition member support. However, the previous 
regressions only allowed me to accept these hypotheses for the 104th Congress. In order to 
account for differences across Congresses, I ran regressions on the same variables for the 108th 
Congress. 
First, I ran a regression on the 108th Congress as a whole. The results for this regression 
are displayed in table seven. These results mirror those from the 104th Congress in two important 
ways. First, the visits coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 level for the 108th Congress. 
This means that when time equaled zero, a member who received visits or whose opponent 
received visits during the campaign was more likely to vote in support of the president’s policy 
preferences. Second, the interaction variable for time and visits is significant at the .05 level and 
in the expected direction. Like members of the 104th Congress, then, members of the 108th 
Congress were more likely to vote in favor of the president’s preferences when they or their 
campaign opponent received a campaign visit and the impact of visits declined as time 
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progressed. Again, this does not necessarily support the indebtedness hypothesis over the 
incentivizing hypothesis. If the impact of visits initially decreased and then increased but the 
decrease was larger than the subsequent increase, the negative coefficient may indicate support 
for the incentivizing hypothesis. The predicted probabilities for the 108th Congress will confirm 
which hypothesis is supported by the negative coefficient on timexvisits. 
Table Seven 
Log-Odds of Voting for the President’s Preferences in the 108th Congress 
 Vote for President’s 
Preferences 
  
Visits 0.541* 
 (0.272) 
  
Time 0.00219*** 
 (0.000565) 
  
Presidential Popularity 0.0209*** 
 (0.00496) 
  
Margin of Victory 0.0109* 
 (0.00453) 
  
Ideological Distance -2.056*** 
 (0.278) 
  
Retiring 0.125 
 (0.0997) 
  
Republican 0.940*** 
 (0.249) 
  
TimexVisits -0.00149* 
 (0.000623) 
  
MarginxVisits 0.00865 
 (0.0101) 
  
TimexMargin -0.0000315** 
 (0.0000109) 
  
Constant -0.784 
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 (0.572) 
Observations 4863 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Two additional results from the regression for the 108th Congress are worth noting. First, 
the interaction variable for time and margin of victory is significant at the .01 level but the 
relationship is in the unexpected direction like it was for Democrats in the 104th Congress. The 
coefficient suggests that the impact of a member’s margin of victory on voting in support of the 
president’s policy preferences decreased as the term progressed. Again, I do not have an 
explanation for the unexpected negative relationship between timexmargin and support for the 
president’s policy preferences. The second interesting result is that both ideological distance 
from the president and Republicanism were significantly related to voting for the president’s 
preferences in the 108th Congress. The regression for the 104th Congress as a whole displayed a 
strongly significant relationship between ideological distance from the president and support, but 
there was no significant relationship between Republicanism and support until ideological 
distance was removed from the regression. In the 108th Congress, however, Republicanism is 
positively and significantly related to support independently of ideological distance from the 
president. This suggests that there was something different about party identification and support 
for the president in the 108th Congress than there was in the 104th Congress. The fact that 
ideological distance from the president captured the entire effect of party on support in the 104th 
Congress indicates that the importance of party did not extend beyond a shared ideology, at least 
insofar as support for the president’s policy preferences was concerned. That party membership 
was significant when the effect of ideology was controlled for in the 108th Congress implies that 
the parties themselves had some influence on their members’ decisions to vote in support of the 
president’s preferences or against the president’s preferences. It is unclear what the mechanism 
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of this influence was and why it was not a factor in the 104th Congress, but the result itself is 
rather interesting.  
 In order to quantify the relationship between visits, time, and support for the president’s 
policy preferences and to clarify which hypothesis is supported, I calculated the predicted 
probability of voting in favor of the president’s policy preferences for each possible value of 
time, visits, and timexvisits for the 108th Congress. The predicted probability for each 
combination is reported in appendix four. Three of the more important predicted probabilities are 
reported in table eight. 
Table Eight 
Predicted Probability of Voting for the President’s Preferences in the 108th Congress 
    Visits=0 Visits=1 Visits=2 
 136 0.396 0.479 0.563 
  (.033) (.049) (.092) 
     
Time 452 0.567 0.534 0.501 
  (.014) (.028) (.059) 
     
 633 0.66 0.565 0.465 
  (.034) (.046) (.087) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 The predicted probabilities for the 108th Congress as a whole are puzzling given the 
patterns of previous probabilities and in light of the negative coefficient for timexvisits in the 
regression results for the 108th Congress. As expected, when average members of the 108th 
Congress did not receive a visit or did not face an opponent who received a visit, their predicted 
probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences increased over time. The fact that 
members who received two visits or faced opponents who received two visits were more likely 
to vote in support of the president’s preferences at the beginning of the Congress and this support 
decreased over time is also consistent with expectations. However, members who received one 
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visit or who faced opponents who received one visit were more likely to vote for the president’s 
preferences as time increased. This pattern of support does not fit either the indebtedness or the 
incentivizing hypothesis. Moreover, it does not make sense that the impact of one visit increased 
over time while the impact of two visits decreased over time. It is possible that these unexpected 
probabilities are a result of the fact that the data for the 108th Congress does not include any 
votes from before the 136th day of the term. The results from the 104th Congress reflected the fact 
that the impact of visits on a member’s likelihood of voting in support of the president was 
strongest at the beginning of the term. Given the fact that there were no key roll call votes on 
domestic or economic policies on which the president took a position until the 136th day of the 
108th Congress, it is possible that much of the effect of visits was not captured and the results are 
skewed. 
Figure Sixteen 
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Figure Seventeen 
 
 
Figure Eighteen 
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That said, there were some expected patterns in the results. Again, the probability of 
voting for the president’s preferences when visits equaled zero and when visits equaled two 
changed in the expected directions over time. Moreover, the predicted probability when visits 
equaled zero surpassed the predicted probability of voting in support of the president’s 
preferences when visits equaled one or two, which is consistent with the predicted probabilities 
for the 104th Congress.  
On the day of the first vote, day 136, average members of the 108th Congress who did not 
receive a visit or face an opponent who received a visit had a 39.6% probability of voting in 
support of the president’s preferences. This probability increased by 8.3% for members who 
received one visit and who had a 47.9% probability of voting in support of the president. 
Members of the 108th Congress who received two visits had an 8.4% increase in their probability 
of supporting the president’s position. These members had a 56.3% probability of voting in 
support of the president’s preferences on day 136. 
The point in time at which the probability of voting in support of the president’s policy 
preferences with zero visits surpassed the probability of doing the same with one or two visits 
was between day 319 and day 452 for the 108th Congress. By the 452nd day, members who did 
not receive visits had a 56.7% likelihood of voting for the president’s policy preferences, while 
members who received one visit had a 53.4% probability of doing so and members who received 
two visits had a 50.1% probability of casting a supporting vote. As in the 104th Congress, the gap 
between the probability of supporting the president with zero visits and with one and two visits 
continued to increase. By the time of the last vote, day 633, members of the 108th Congress who 
did not receive visits had a 66% probability of voting for the president’s preferences and had a 
26.4% total increase in probability over the course of the Congress. Members who received one 
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visit had a 56.5% probability of voting in support of the president and had an 8.6% total increase 
in probability from day 136 to day 633. Finally, members of the 108th Congress who received 
two visits from President Bush in the 2002 midterm campaign had a 46.5% probability of voting 
in favor of his preferences on day 633. These members had a 9.8% total decrease in their 
probability of voting in line with the president’s preferences over the course of the Congress. 
 The predicted probabillities for the 108th Congress complicate the the results of this study 
because they do not conform to the indebtedness hypothesis or the incentivizing hypothesis. If 
they supported the indebtedness hypothesis, members of Congress who received visits would 
have had higher levels of support at the beginning of the Congress and this support would have 
decreased over time. The indebtedness hypothesis describes the support levels of members who 
received two visits, but it does not describe the way in which members of the 108th Congress 
who received one visit increasingly supported the president’s preferences over time. The 
incentivizing hypothesis is not supported by the predicted probabilities for members who 
received one visit as this hypothesis posits that members who received visits will have higher 
levels of support toward the beginning and toward the end of the Congress. The predicted 
probabilities for members who received one visit show a general increase in support over time, 
not high levels of support dropping and then increasing again over time. Therefore, the predicted 
probabilities for the 108th Congress do not support either of the hypotheses that I expected to 
explain the impact of visits on voting in support of the president’s preferences. 
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Figure Nineteen 
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day 136 in the 108th Congress means that the data may be skewed and it is possible that the 
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time before day 136. It may also be possible that breaking the results down for Democrats and 
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that both of the variables were statistically significant for the 108th Congress overall and it is 
unclear where that significance was generated. Limiting the regressions to members with smaller 
margins of victory does not reveal any significant relationship between visits, time, and voting in 
favor of the president’s preferences or between visits, margin of victory, and voting in support of 
the president’s desired policies. The fact that the data for the 108th Congress starts with the 136th 
day may again be to blame for the odd results displayed in table nine. If the impact of visits is 
indeed greatest toward the beginning of a term, as it was in the 104th Congress, it may be that too 
much of the effect of visits remains unaccounted for when the first vote considered in the data 
took place well after the 108th Congress began. 
Table Nine 
Log-Odds of Voting in Favor of the President’s Preferences in the 108th Congress by Party 
 Republicans Democrats 
   
Visits 0.0352 -0.691 
 (0.266) (0.859) 
   
Time -0.00311*** 0.00590*** 
 (0.000502) (0.000856) 
   
Presidential Popularity 0.00672 0.0393** 
 (0.00653) (0.0125) 
   
Margin of Victory -0.00188 -0.0115 
 (0.00564) (0.0118) 
   
Ideological Distance -1.560*** -3.681*** 
 (0.383) (0.317) 
   
Retiring 0.0941 0.0105 
 (0.138) (0.142) 
   
TimexVisits 0.0000871 0.000974 
 (0.000464) (0.00151) 
   
MarginxVisits 0.00977 -0.0109 
 (0.0126) (0.0118) 
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TimexMargin 0.00000832 0.0000182 
 (0.00000984) (0.0000216) 
   
Constant 2.715*** -1.293 
 (0.521) (1.025) 
Observations 2755 2108 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 It is difficult to draw any conclusions about the impact of visits over time and over 
margin of victory on a member’s likelihood of voting in support of the president’s preferences in 
the 108th Congress because the regression results and predicted probabilities for this Congress 
are inconsistent. An initial regression on the 108th Congress as a whole supports the indebtedness 
hypothesis because the statistically significant negative coefficient for the interaction variable for 
time and visits means that campaign visits increased a member’s likelihood of voting in support 
of the president’s preferences and that the impact of visits decreased over time. The predicted 
probabilities for average members in the 108th Congress partially confirm this relationship. When 
members received two visits in the previous midterm campaign, they were more likely to vote in 
support of the president’s preferences than those who did not receive visits and this support 
decreased over time. However, while members who received one visit were more likely to vote 
in support of the president’s preferences than those who did not at the beginning of the Congress, 
this support increased over time. This does not support the indebtedness hypothesis or the 
incentivizing hypothesis. Additionally, running regressions for each party revealed no 
statistically significant relationship for time, visits, and voting for the president’s preferences or 
margin, visits, and voting in support of his desired policies. To the extent that I can draw 
conclusions from these mixed results, I must accept the null hypothesis for opposition party 
members and reject the indebtedness hypothesis, but I do so with considerable caution. 
 The fact that visits had the greatest effect on a member’s likelihood of voting in support 
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of the president’s preferences at the earliest date in the predicted probabilities for the 104th 
Congress and for members who received two visits in the 108th Congress overall leads me to 
suspect that the data for the 108th Congress does not accurately reflect the relationships between 
visits, time, and votes and visits, margin of victory and votes. The first key vote on a domestic or 
economic policy on which the president took a position in the 108th Congress was not until the 
136th day of the Congress, which means that most of the beginning of the Congress is simply not 
included in the data set. If the impact of visits was highest during that period, as it was in the 
104th Congress, not having any votes that occurred before the 136th day of Congress may mean 
that much of the effect of visits is simply not captured in the data. Therefore, the lack of votes 
from the first 135 days of the 108th Congress may be the cause of the mixed results in the 
predicted probabilities and of the lack of significance for the interaction variables for visits and 
time and visits and margin of victory in the regressions for Democrats and Republicans in the 
108th Congress. 
 Fortunately, the results from the 104th Congress are much clearer than those from the 
108th Congress. The results from the regression and the predicted probabilities for the 104th 
Congress overall support the indebtedness hypothesis, which states that visits have an impact on 
a member’s likelihood of voting in support of the president and this support decreases over time. 
The statistically significant negative coefficient for the interaction variable for time and visits in 
the regression for the 104th Congress reflects this decreasing impact of visits over time. This 
decrease is also reflected in the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress as a whole, which 
also quantify the impact of visits. At their greatest impact, on day 22, increasing visits from zero 
to one increases an average member’s probability of voting in support of the president’s 
preferences by 12.8%, two visits increases this probability by 11.4%, and three visits increases it 
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by 9%.  The results for Democrats in the 104th Congress display the same statistically significant 
negative coefficient for time and visits and the predicted probabilities also reflect the decreasing 
impact of visits over time and both therefore support the indebtedness hypothesis. When visits 
had the greatest impact, on day 22, one visit increased an average Democrat’s probability of 
voting in support of the president by 9.4%, two visits increased the probability of voting in 
support of his preferences by 6.4%, and three visits increased this probability by 4.1%.  
Finally, the results of the regression and the predicted probabilities of voting in support of 
the president’s preferences for Republicans who won their seats by margins of less than 10% 
partially support the opposition party hypothesis, which posits that members of the opposition 
party will be more likely to support the president’s preferences when they won their districts by 
smaller margins of victory and that this support will be greatest toward the end of the Congress. 
The regression for this cohort did not show a significant relationship between time and visits, so 
the aspect of the opposition party hypothesis that specifies the timing of the support ought to be 
rejected. The regression for such Republicans revealed a statistically significant negative 
coefficient for the interaction variable for margin of victory and visits, which indicated that 
members with smaller margins of victory were more likely to vote for the president’s preferences 
when their opponents received visits and this impact decreased as margins increased.  
The predicted probabilities for this cohort also support the hypothesis that the impact of 
visits decreases as margins increase and quantified the impact of visits. This impact was greatest 
with a margin of victory of .5%. Average Republicans in the 104th Congress who won by .5% 
had a 27.6% increase in their probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences when 
visits increased from zero to one. Members of this cohort whose opponents received two visits 
had a 25.3% increase in probability and members whose opponents received three visits had a 
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13.2% increase in their probability of voting in support of the president’s policy preferences.  
 Therefore, I can accept the indebtedness hypothesis and the opposition party member 
hypothesis excluding the portion of the hypothesis that deals with the timing of opposition 
member support. When members of the 104th Congress received campaign visits, they were more 
likely to vote in support of the president’s policy preferences. This support was greatest at the 
beginning of the term and decreased over time. Members of the Republican Party who won their 
seats by a margin of less than 10% against an opponent who received visits were more likely to 
support the president’s preferences when they had margins of victory of less than 8%. The 
impact of visits was greatest at the lowest margin of victory and decreased significantly as 
margins increased to 10%. 
Conclusion 
 This study began as an attempt to push for more innovation in the study of presidential 
legislative success. Scholars of presidential legislative success consistently debate the same 
causal factors, like presidential popularity and presidential skill, and rarely examine the effect of 
other factors. The fact that I found a statistically and substantively significant relationship 
between campaign visits to congressional candidates and support for the president’s preferences 
in the 104th Congress is an indication that scholars would benefit from analyzing new causal 
factors rather than treating the field of presidential legislative success as if the only thing left to 
be determined is the size of the effect of the typically studied factors.  
 The results of this study are also of practical importance to political pundits and to 
presidential administrations.  When pundits understand that presidents can use campaign visits to 
increase the support for their policy preferences, they are better able to analyze or even predict 
presidential travel during midterm elections. More importantly, however, is the way in which 
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presidential administrations can use the knowledge of the relationship between visits and support 
to plan legislative strategy. One of the reasons that I chose to examine campaign visits as a 
causal factor of support for the president’s preferences was that a significant relationship 
between the two would give presidents a tool that they could use to proactively improve the 
likelihood of support from members of Congress. Many of the typically studied causal factors of 
legislative success, like partisan composition of Congress and presidential popularity, cannot be 
easily used to increase the president’s likelihood of success. For example, knowing that the 
opposition party has a large majority in the Congress only helps the president increase the 
probability that his policy preferences will be passed insofar as he is aware of the fact that 
members of the opposition probably will not support a given policy and he should wait for a 
more favorable reconfiguration of Congress to promote a given policy. The advantage of 
campaign visits as a causal factor of support for the president’s policy preferences is that the 
president can use them to improve the probability of support without a large expenditure of 
resources. 
 The results from the 104th Congress in this study provide a guide as to how presidents can 
best use campaign visits to increase the probability of support from different members of 
Congress. There are two types of potential members that presidents can target with campaign 
visits. First, presidents can target potential opposition party members by visiting candidates who 
are in extremely close races in which the opposition candidate may win by a very small margin 
of victory. Opposition party members are less likely to vote in support of the president’s 
preferences without visits than members of the president’s party, so using visits to increase the 
probability of support from opposition candidates may increase the probability of support the 
most. Indeed, the predicted probabilities for Republicans with margins of less than 10% in the 
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104th Congress show that opposition party members who won their seats by very small margins 
of victory against candidates who received visits had a much greater probability of voting in 
support of the president’s preferences than those who did not face such an opponent. Another 
advantage of targeting opposition party members is that, unlike those of the president’s co-
partisans, their probabilities of voting in support of the president’s preferences do not change 
over time. Therefore, the probability of voting in support of the president’s policy preferences for 
members of the opposition party members will be sustained throughout the Congress. 
 However, the predicted probabilities of the 104th Congress also show some of the 
disadvantages of using campaign visits to target potential opposition members. First, the margins 
of victory at which campaign visits increase the probability of support to over 50% are very 
small. In the 104th Congress, for example, members of the opposition party who won their seats 
by a margin of between 5.5% and 7.5% and whose opponents received campaign visits had 
higher probabilities of voting in support of the president’s preferences than those whose 
opponents did not receive visits, but neither type of opposition party member had a probability of 
support over 50%. Second, the impact of visits on a member’s support is dependent on that 
member having a very small margin of victory and there is simply no way that a president or his 
advisors can accurately predict margins of victory. Because the range of margins at which visits 
substantively increase a member’s probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences 
is so small, there is a considerable risk of wasting resources on targeting opposition members 
who end up winning by margins of victory that fall outside of the substantive range. Presidents 
would, therefore, best use their resources by targeting potential members from their own party 
rather than potential opposition party members. 
 The predicted probabilities from the 104th Congress provide guidance as to how 
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presidents can best target members of their own party. The disadvantage of targeting potential 
co-partisans with campaign visits is that the impact of such visits decreases over time and is 
therefore inevitably unsustainable. Moreover, at some point between the 400th and 500th day of 
Congress, the probability of voting in support of the president’s preferences for co-partisans who 
did not receive visits will be greater than the probability of doing the same for members who did 
receive visits. However, the fact that the impact of visits is dependent on time is also an 
advantage because, unlike when visits are dependent on margin of victory, there is no possibility 
of wasting resources on visiting potential members of Congress who will not end up with 
increased probabilities of support. Furthermore, the gap between the probability of support for 
members with zero visits and members with one visits after the point between 400 and 500 days 
is rather small. The president’s co-partisans who received one visit have a higher probability of 
voting in support of the president’s preferences than those with zero visits at the beginning of the 
Congress and only a slightly smaller probability of support once probabilities with zero visits 
surpass those with one visit. Therefore, the best strategy that presidents can pursue when using 
campaign visits to increase the probability of support for their policy preferences is to target 
potential members of their own party with one visit. 
 This recommendation is based only on the results for the 104th Congress because of the 
mixed results that were obtained in the analysis of the 108th Congress. If the relationships 
between visits, time, and support and visits, margin, and support were clarified for the 108th 
Congress, the implications of this study could possibly change. Therefore, future research ought 
to begin by expanding the data for the 108th Congress by including other types of votes, such as 
foreign policy votes. Similarly, future research can expand on this study by examining the effect 
of visits in different Congresses, which may also make my results more generalizable if future 
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scholars increase the variation in contextual factors, such as the size of the majority in Congress, 
that may influence a member’s likelihood of supporting the president. Another avenue for future 
research is the effect of campaign visits on support after presidential election years, not midterm 
elections. The honeymoon effect may overlap with the increased support levels at the beginning 
of Congresses and therefore the impact of visits may change after presidential elections. Finally, 
future studies may wish to examine the impact of visits by party notables on support for the 
president’s preferences. The president is not the only party figure that campaigns for candidates 
and visits from party notables representing the president’s administration, like first ladies and 
vice presidents, may also impact a member’s likelihood of supporting the president’s policy 
preferences. In sum, very little is known about the effect of campaign visits on support for the 
president’s preferences because there has been little discussion of it as a causal factor of support 
by scholars. As such, the avenues for future research on the effect of campaign visits are 
numerous.  
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Appendix One 
 
Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of the President’s Preferences in the 104th 
Congress 
   
Visits=0 Visits=1 Visits=2 Visits=3 
Time 22 0.486 0.614 0.728 0.818 
  (.031) (.054) (.087) (.098) 
      
 63 0.496 0.61 0.714 0.799 
  (.027) (.049) (.08) (.095) 
      
 84 0.502 0.609 0.707 0.789 
  (.026) (.046) (.077) (.094) 
      
 96 0.505 0.609 0.703 0.784 
  (.025) (.044) (.076) (.093) 
      
 137 0.515 0.605 0.689 0.762 
  (.021) (.039) (.069) (.089) 
      
 210 0.533 0.6 0.663 0.721 
  (.015) (.032) (.059) (.081) 
      
 215 0.534 0.6 0.662 0.719 
  (.015) (.031) (.059) (.081) 
      
 291 0.553 0.594 0.634 0.673 
  (.01) (.026) (.052) (.075) 
      
 298 0.555 0.593 0.631 0.667 
  (.01) (.026) (.051) (.075) 
      
 304 0.556 0.593 0.629 0.663 
  (.01) (.025) (.051) (.075) 
      
 323 0.561 0.592 0.621 0.65 
  (.009) (.025) (.051) (.075) 
      
 353 0.569 0.589 0.61 0.63 
  (.009) (.025) (.051) (.076) 
      
 396 0.579 0.586 0.593 0.6 
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  (.01) (.027) (.054) (.082) 
      
 437 0.589 0.583 0.577 0.571 
  (.013) (.029) (.059) (.09) 
      
 444 0.591 0.583 0.574 0.566 
  (.013) (.03) (.06) (.092) 
      
 451 0.592 0.582 0.571 0.561 
  (.014) (.031) (.064) (.094) 
      
 452 0.593 0.582 0.571 0.56 
  (.014) (.031) (.062) (.094) 
      
 494 0.603 0.579 0.554 0.53 
  (.017) (.035) (.07) (.106) 
      
 508 0.606 0.578 0.549 0.519 
  (.018) (.037) (.073) (.11) 
      
 569 0.621 0.573 0.524 0.475 
  (.022) (.044) (.086) (.13) 
      
 577 0.623 0.572 0.521 0.469 
  (.023) (.045) (.088) (.132) 
      
 636 0.636 0.568 0.497 0.426 
  (.027) (.054) (.103) (.151) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Appendix Two 
 
Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of the President’s Preferences for Democrats in 
the 104th Congress  
    
Visits=0 Visits=1 Visits=2 Visits=3 
Time 22 0.743 0.837 0.901 0.942 
  (.035) (.034) (.036) (.032) 
      
 63 0.752 0.835 0.895 0.934 
  (.03) (.031) (.035) (.034) 
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 84 0.756 0.834 0.891 0.93 
  (.027) (.029) (.035) (.034) 
      
 96 0.759 0.834 0.889 0.927 
  (.026) (.028) (.034) (.034) 
      
 137 0.768 0.833 0.882 0.918 
  (.021) (.025) (.033) (.036) 
      
 210 0.783 0.83 0.868 0.899 
  (.014) (.021) (.032) (.038) 
      
 215 0.784 0.83 0.867 0.897 
  (.014) (.021) (.032) (.038) 
      
 291 0.799 0.827 0.851 0.873 
  (.008) (.018) (.033) (.044) 
      
 298 0.8 0.826 0.85 0.87 
  (.008) (.018) (.033) (.044) 
      
 304 0.801 0.826 0.848 0.868 
  (.008) (.018) (.033) (.045) 
      
 323 0.805 0.825 0.844 0.861 
  (.008) (.018) (.034) (.047) 
      
 353 0.811 0.824 0.837 0.849 
  (.008) (.019) (.036) (.051) 
      
 396 0.818 0.823 0.827 0.831 
  (.01) (.02) (.039) (.058) 
      
 437 0.825 0.821 0.816 0.812 
  (.012) (.023) (.044) (.067) 
      
 444 0.827 0.821 0.814 0.808 
  (.012) (.023) (.045) (.069) 
      
 451 0.828 0.82 0.813 0.805 
  (.013) (.023) (.046) (.071) 
      
 452 0.828 0.82 0.812 0.804 
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  (.013) (.024) (.046) (.071) 
      
 494 0.835 0.819 0.801 0.782 
  (.015) (.027) (.052) (.083) 
      
 508 0.837 0.818 0.797 0.774 
  (.016) (.028) (.054) (.087) 
      
 569 0.847 0.816 0.78 0.739 
  (.02) (.033) (.066) (.109) 
      
 577 0.848 0.815 0.777 0.734 
  (.02) (.034) (.067) (.112) 
      
 636 0.857 0.813 0.759 0.695 
  (.023) (.04) (.081) (.136) 
      
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Appendix Three 
Predicted Probability of Voting for the President’s Preferences for Republicans in the 104th 
Congress with Margins of Less Than 10% 
    Visits=0 Visits=1 Visits=2 Visits=3 
Margin 0.5 0.266 0.542 0.795 0.927 
  (.07) (.16) (.193) (.119) 
      
 1 0.261 0.515 0.761 0.905 
  (.061) (.15) (.203) (.142) 
      
 1.5 0.256 0.487 0.724 0.879 
  (.053) (.138) (.21) (.168) 
      
 2 0.251 0.459 0.683 0.845 
  (.046) (.127) (.216) (.195) 
      
 2.5 0.246 0.432 0.64 0.805 
  (.038) (.115) (.216) (.222) 
      
 3 0.241 0.405 0.593 0.758 
  (.032) (.104) (.214) (.248) 
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 3.5 0.236 0.379 0.546 0.703 
  (.026) (.094) (.209) (.27) 
      
 4 0.231 0.353 0.497 0.642 
  (.022) (.085) (.202) (.286) 
      
 4.5 0.227 0.328 0.449 0.575 
  (.021) (.078) (.193) (.295) 
      
 5 0.222 0.304 0.401 0.506 
  (.022) (.072) (.182) (.295) 
      
 5.5 0.218 0.281 0.355 0.437 
  (.025) (.068) (.172) (.288) 
      
 6 0.213 0.259 0.312 0.37 
  (.029) (.066) (.161) (.273) 
      
 6.5 0.209 0.239 0.272 0.307 
  (.034) (.065) (.151) (.252) 
      
 7 0.204 0.219 0.235 0.251 
  (.039) (.065) (.141) (.228) 
      
 7.5 0.2 0.201 0.202 0.202 
  (.045) (.065) (.131) (.202) 
      
 8 0.2 0.184 0.172 0.161 
  (.05) (.066) (.121) (.175) 
      
 8.5 0.192 0.168 0.146 0.127 
  (.055) (.067) (.117) (.15) 
      
 9 0.188 0.153 0.123 0.099 
  (.06) (.067) (.102) (.127) 
      
 9.5 0.184 0.139 0.104 0.077 
  (.065) (.067) (.093) (.106) 
      
 10 0.18 0.126 0.087 0.059 
  (.07) (.067) (.084) (.088) 
      
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Appendix Four 
 
Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of the President’s Preferences in the 108th 
Congress 
    Visits=0 Visits=1 Visits=2 
 136 0.396 0.479 0.563 
  (.033) (.049) (.092) 
     
 185 0.422 0.487 0.554 
  (.028) (.043) (.082) 
     
 199 0.429 0.49 0.551 
  (.026) (.041) (.079) 
     
 246 0.455 0.498 0.542 
  (.02) (.036) (.071) 
     
 269 0.467 0.502 0.537 
  (.017) (.034) (.067) 
     
 319 0.494 0.511 0.527 
  (.012) (.03) (.061) 
     
Time 452 0.567 0.534 0.501 
  (.014) (.028) (.059) 
     
 535 0.611 0.548 0.484 
  (.023) (.035) (.069) 
     
 549 0.618 0.551 0.481 
  (.025) (.036) (.071) 
     
 617 0.652 0.562 0.468 
  (.032) (.044) (.084) 
     
 626 0.657 0.564 0.466 
  (.033) (.045) (.087) 
     
 633 0.66 0.565 0.465 
  (.034) (.046) (.087) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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i Key domestic and economic policy votes on which the president took a position were identified 
by Congressional Quarterly. CQ defines a key vote as a vote that is 1. “a matter of major 
controversy”; 2. “a matter of presidential or political power”; or 3. “a matter of potentially great 
impact on the nation and lives of Americans” (“How CQ Picks Key Votes” 2007). CQ identifies 
presidential position taking on votes by “analyzing his messages to Congress, news conference 
remarks and other public statements and documents” (“Explanation of Statistics, Cont’d” 2007).  
ii Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/>. 
iii An example of a visit made by President Clinton in 1994 was when he remarked, “You have a 
chance to replace…two Members of Congress that are leaving with Mike Doyle and Bill 
Leavens, and I hope you will vote for them” (Clinton 1994). Another example of a visit was 
President Bush’s comment to members of Jim Nussle’s district that “it’s in your best interest to 
make sure that Jim Nussle is reelected to the United States Congress” (Bush 2002). 
iv The percentage of the vote received by each member and his or her closest opponent was 
obtained from the CQ Almanac Online.  
v It was difficult to be consistent in the precise amount of time between the approval ratings and 
each vote because Gallup’s polls were not taken at consistent time intervals. I used the job 
approval rating closest to a given vote unless the rating was from the five days before that vote. 
Although this five day period is a somewhat arbitrary, I felt that I needed to account for a 
potential gap between the time that polls were taken and the time that polls were released. I am 
interested in the way in which members of Congress might alter their voting behavior in 
response to presidential popularity, so ensuring that members of Congress were aware of the 
president’s approval rating at the time of each vote was as important as the approval rating itself. 
Unfortunately, Gallup’s website does not indicate the date that they released the president’s job 
approval ratings. I decided on a five day period after a survey of Gallup’s recent press releases 
about the president’s approval ratings, most of which were released three days after polls were 
taken. I added an additional two days to this period to account for the fact that polls may have 
been released more slowly during the Clinton and Bush administrations. The extra two days also 
account for the possibility that some members of Congress may not have seen the president’s job 
approval ratings right after they were released. President Clinton’s job approval ratings are 
available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/116584/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-Bill-
Clinton.aspx#1>. President George W. Bush’s job approval ratings are available at 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-George-Bush.aspx>. 
vi Only the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE scale was used in the two data sets. The first 
dimension measures a member’s position on a liberal-conservative scale on issues of government 
intervention in the economy. The second dimension accounts for the North-South racial conflict 
before the Civil War and during the conflict over civil rights until the mid-1970s. This dimension 
was not included in the two data sets because it is no longer significant. After the end of the 
battle for civil rights, racial issues increasingly became issues of economic redistribution that 
could be captured along the first dimension. According to Poole, “Voting on race related issues 
now largely takes place along the liberal-conservative dimension and the old split in the 
Democratic Party between North and South has largely disappeared” (Poole 2007, 3). 
vii This information was obtained from CQ’s Voting and Elections Collection online. It is 
available at <http://library.cqpress.com/elections/candidatehistories.php>.  
viii For example, in order to get the predicted probability of voting in favor of the president’s 
policy preference on the 22nd day of Congress, the day of the first vote included in the data, I 
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held time, visits, and timexvisits at the following values: time=22, visits=0, and timexvisits=0; 
time=22, visits=1, and timexvisits=22; time=22, visits=2, and timexvisits=44; and time=22, 
visits=3, and timexvisits=66. 
ix The predicted probabilities of voting in support of the president’s preferences when visits 
equals three ought to be considered with caution because only one member of the 104th Congress 
received three visits. 
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